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The key recommendation from this study is to purpose the Brazilian National Civil
Aviation Authority evaluation over the implementation of a new voluntary and non-punitive
safety reporting program, with a different scope from the current one. The voluntary selfreporting programs in place in the USA, Europe and Australia should be used as a regulatory
reference and the program development and implementation should be executed in close
coordination with the different industry stakeholders.
To access if the current Brazilian State Safety reporting system meets ICAO
requirements, the researchers accessed pertinent aviation safety regulatory legislation.
Additionally, to access if the current Brazilian State Safety reporting system is effective, the
researchers surveyed 488 airline pilots operating under RBAC 121 and interviewed the other two
stakeholders involved, the safety managers of both ANAC and Brazilian Airlines.

The data found conclude that airline pilots have a culture of self-reporting and the
stakeholders interviewed understand that Brazil has a reporting system with the opportunity for
further development of some extremely important features to make it more effective and raise its
level of contribution to flight safety.
Finally, the researchers recommend that there be an update to the current Brazilian
Aviation Authorities voluntary reporting system, in a way that the National CAA be assured to
access all the content of each report, but only after the dissemination of the concepts of Just
Culture across ANAC and Brazilian Civil Aviation. This update must be created and maintained
by system stakeholders focusing on improving the Brazilian Operational Safety Program (PSOBR).
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Chapter I

Introduction
This research project intends to study the enhancement of the Aviation Safety Report
system in the scope of the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority, ANAC (Agência Nacional de
Aviação Civil). The aim is to analyze foreign CAAs (Civil Aviation Authorities) which have
already implemented their own Aviation Safety Report Programs. These comparisons will
serve as a benchmark for the development of the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority Safety
Report program.
Brazil has a continental size, making the airline industry a vital industry to connect regions
and move people and goods. For this reason, Brazil has the largest airline industry in South
America, having more than 600 aircraft registered by the airlines for passenger transportation
(ANAC, 2020) and employing more than 5000 pilots (ANAC, 2020).
Brazil is a contracting state of the International Civil Aviation Organization - ICAO,
and it has a solid record in terms of aviation safety. It is rated as Category 1 in FAA’s
International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) Program and presents an excellent ICAO
standards implementation level in terms of Safety Oversight.
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Figure 1 - Comparison of Brazilian Level of Effective Implementation of ICAO SARPs
vs World Average
Despite this strong performance in terms of safety, Brazil still has some room for
improvements in the scope of the state safety program. Especially regarding the hazard
identification process through a voluntary non-punitive safety reporting program.
Our project intends to research the implementation of a non-punitive Aviation Safety
Report process in the scope of the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority (ANAC - Agência
Nacional de Aviação Civil). The aim is to analyze foreign CAAs (Civil Aviation Authorities)
that already implemented their own non-punitive Aviation Safety Report programs to serve as
a benchmark for developing the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority non-punitive Safety Report
program.
In the research about non-punitive Safety Reporting, we focused on the Brazilian Civil
Aviation Authority Safety Management System regulation. First, the researchers compared it to
the FAA Safety regulations and other Civil Aviation Authority non-punitive safety reporting
programs. Then, after assessing different country aviation safety regulations, the FAA Aviation
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Safety Action Program (ASAP) appeared to be relevant in terms of safety reporting. Therefore,
that could be used as a framework and theoretical lens for the proposed research.

Problem Statement
This research project intends to use material from other authorities that already have the
ASAP in place and use them as a benchmark to help ANAC in the assessment of the viability
and benefits of the implementation of such kind of non-punitive safety program in Brazil.
Therefore, the study will approach the already existing FAA ASAP, the Australian Transport
Safety Board (ATSB) Aviation Self Reporting Scheme (ASRS), and possibly other agencies to
benchmark the program.
The benchmark will concentrate on:
● The overall Safety Report regulations;
● The type of data contained on it;
● The identification protection of the reporter;
● The institutions involved in each case analysis;
● The outcomes of the program and;
● The KPIs (key performance indicators).
This research also seeks to understand if the implementation of a non-punitive
Voluntary Safety Self-Report Program by ANAC could increase the voluntary report's
emission quantity.
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Project Definition
Aviation Safety Management has been evolving since the very first flight attempts. It
has changed dramatically throughout the years to adapt to new technologies and materials and
increase human performance in this high-risk environment. The most recent change in Aviation
Safety Management was introduced by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
in 2010. It is called the Safety Management System (SMS).
The SMS is defined by ICAO “as a systematic approach to managing safety, including
the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedure” (International
Civil Aviation Organization, n.d.). In addition, it should establish “a learning culture within an
aviation organization that continually seeks and analyzes information, then turns that
information into action that eliminates or mitigates safety risks, before they become unwanted
events” (Federal Aviation Authority, 2021).
For a Safety Management System to be effective, States (through the State Safety
Program - SSP) and organizations (using the SMS framework) must develop a process for
hazard identifications and data collection. One of the essential methods for hazard
identification is voluntary safety reporting. The front-line personnel perform this process better
than managers since they observe hazards as part of their daily activities.
The encouragement of solid safety culture could be based on a strong self-reporting
system. According to ICAO DOC 9859 - Safety Management Manual (Fourth Edition, 2018),
safety culture is identified as "how people behave to safety and risk when no one is watching"
(3.1.1). Therefore, the safety culture is determined by people’s behavior and how they will
manifest it.
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According to the ICAO Safety Management Manual, whether organizations or
individuals are willing to report their experiences and errors is mainly dependent on the
perceived benefits and disadvantages associated with the act of reporting (International Civil
Aviation Organization, 2018).
The National Civil Aviation Authority has a crucial role to play in the reporting of
safety issues. It is required from the ICAO Contracting States the implementation of
regulations that support and encourage a positive safety culture. More importantly, states
should ensure the protection of safety data, safety information, and sources, “especially if the
information provided is self-incriminating” (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2018).
Unlike some other National Civil Aviation Authorities, the Brazilian Civil Aviation
Authority regulations do not provide any guidance on how the safety information should be
handled, especially the self-incriminating kind. Another important aspect is the fact that the
Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority has so far not implemented any sort of voluntary SELFreporting program.

Project Goals and Scope
This research project’s goal is to explore the potential benefits of implementing a nonpunitive voluntary safety report by the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority. The result is
expected to contribute to Brazil's National aviation safety, bringing value to the airline
industry, managers, pilots, and other aviation professionals. Finally, this project could benefit
the passengers, so-called users, or clients. In the end, the more the airline industry safety
indicators get better, the more the airline industry thrives.
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Therefore, this study intends to identify gaps (if any exists) between the Brazilian
regulations and the ICAO recommendations for their Contracting States regarding voluntary
safety report systems. Our analysis also gives theoretical reasoning for implementing a nonpunitive voluntary safety report system by the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority. This will be
achieved through the examination of regulations from other National Civil Aviation
Authorities.
Brazil is one of the signatory members of ICAO and operates a vast commercial fleet.
This association can bring the potential exchange of valuable lessons learned from the Safety
Reports. These lessons can contribute to aviation safety in many other states. All the major
airlines in Brazil operate under the RBAC 121, the ANAC regulation for public air transport
operations with airplanes with a maximum certified passenger seating configuration of over 19
seats or maximum payload capacity above 3,400 kg. According to this regulation, airlines must
have their own Safety Report Programs. Highly reliable organizations, such as those involved
in aviation, carry out very complex jobs and consistently minimize risks while maintaining a
commitment to safety at all levels.
These commitments help to establish a “culture of safety.” With that comes the Just
Culture concept, which fortifies an environment without the focus of guilt, where individuals
can report mistakes or near-accidents without fear of reprimand or punishment. Employees
should be encouraged to collaborate to seek solutions to safety issues along with an
organizational commitment.
According to Bienefield and Grote (2012), in the article “Silence that may kill”: "By
interviewing employees from a variety of organizations,” Milliken et al. (2003) developed a
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framework of reasons for silence. More recently, Detert and Edmondson (2011) came up with
a comparable framework of reasons for speaking up. Regardless of whether the focus of the
investigation was on silence or on speaking up, the authors of both studies argued that socalled implicit voice theories determine whether people speak up or not. Implicit voice theories
are subjective beliefs about when, what, and to whom it is appropriate to speak up. These
theories have their origin in people’s social upbringing and can be influenced by organizational
culture and collective sense-making, as well as by group norms and team climate”. Speak up,
or reporting requires a resilient and trustable system.

Contributions Expected from the Study / Importance of Topic
The project will attempt to bring the perspective of the airline industry's main
stakeholders about the implementation of a non-punitive safety report by the Brazilian Civil
Aviation Authority. For this purpose, an online questionnaire will be distributed among airline
pilots operating under the RBAC 121 regulations. In addition, a structured interview will also be
done with Airline Safety Managers, Union Representatives. and Brazilian Civil Aviation
Managers.
As an ICAO contracting State, Brazil should “implement and enforce SARPs contained
in the Annexes to the Convention” of 1944 (ICAO, 2006). In addition, ICAO Annex 19 Safety Management, requires that the contracting states “shall establish a voluntary safety
reporting system to collect safety data and safety information not captured by the mandatory
safety reporting system” (ICAO, 2016).
Although it is a requirement established in the Brazilian civil aviation agency
regulations that airlines must have a voluntary reporting program, the agency has not yet
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implemented its voluntary safety reporting program. Therefore, the Brazilian state may not be
complying with the requirement set out in ICAO Annex 19. Still, more importantly, it may be
failing to receive information relevant to flight safety. This is supported by the fact that the
action plans - which results from each processed report - have a direct positive impact on
aeronautical operational safety.
Additionally, besides the surveys and interviews conducted, the research project will
aim to identify the perception and credibility among stakeholders. This will be done to
guarantee supportive evidence if ANAC chooses to go ahead with the implementation of a
non-punitive safety report program.
Thus, this project aims to contribute:
● To improve the Brazilian aviation industry safety;
● To promote a positive safety culture;
● To understand what are the main factors that would motivate pilots to report
their errors in a non-punitive reporting system; and
● To enhance the hazard identification process by the Brazilian Civil Aviation
Authority.

Research Questions
These are the questions our research seeks to answer:
● Is the Brazilian CAA observing the requirement of Annex 19?
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● Would a program like ASAP fulfill the requirements of both ICAO and Brazilian
CAA legislation regarding the hazard identification and risk management
program?
● Could this new Brazilian Safety Report program improve the pilot’s willingness
to report Safety issues to the Brazilian CAA?
● Would Brazilian airlines be willing to be part of a “tripartite” agreement with
ANAC and SNA to open a new channel for a volunteer, confidential and selfreport ASR program?
● With specific regulation and application, would airline pilots be more likely to
be credible about non-punitive reporting system?

Definitions of Terms
Aviation Occurrences

A term used to describe events that are not classified as
incident or accident

Air Safety Report

A report or form to collect information on actual or
potential safety deficiencies during air operations

Findings

A term used to record non-compliance with Civil
Aviation legislation (NZ CAA, 2021)

Just Culture

A term used to describe when the punishment is totally
unbound of the situations in which punishment is
applicable and promotes learning from mistakes.
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ICAO Contracting States

A term used to define States which have ratified or adhered
to the Chicago Convention by the provisions of its Chapter
XXI

Non-Punitive Reporting

Definition including citation, as needed.

SMS

Safety Management System, A term used to a formal, topdown, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk
and assuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls. It
includes systematic procedures, practices, and policies for
the management of safety risk. (FAA Order 8000.369).

List of Acronyms

ANAC

Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority)

AQD

Aviation Quality Database

ASAP

Aviation Safety Action Program

ASIPAER

Advisory Services for the Aeronautical Accident Prevention System

ASO

Alerta de Segurança Operacional (Air Safety Alert)

ASR

Air Safety Report

ASRS

Aviation Self Reporting System (Australia)

ATSB

Australian Transport Safety Board

BI

Business Intelligence

CAA

Civil Aviation Authority

CASA

Australian Civil Aviation Authority
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CENIPA

Centro de Investigação e Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos (Brazilian
National Aeronautical Accidents Investigation and Prevention Board)

CMA

Continuous Monitoring Approach

COMAER

Brazilian Air Force Command

EASA

European Aviation Safety Agency

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FAA AC

Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular

ICA

Air Force Command Instructions

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

IFALPA

International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations

INSAG

International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group

PSO-BR

Programa Brasileiro para a Segurança Operacional da Aviação Civil –
Brazilian Civil Aviation Operational Safety Program)

NSCA

Air Force Command Rules

NTSB

National Transport Safety Board

RASO

Relatório Anual de Segurança Operacional (Annual Operational Safety
Report, from ANAC)

RBAC

Regulamento Brasileiro de Aviação Civil (Equivalent to the FAR for the
FAA)

RCSV

Report to CENIPA for Flight Safety

RELPREV

Prevention Report

SMS

Safety Management System

SARP

Standards and Recommended Practices

SSM

Safety Management Manual
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SSP

State Safety Program

USOAP

Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program

VDRP

Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program

Plan of Study
We begin by introducing the Safety Management System concepts and the role of each
ICAO contracting state in establishing the State safety policies and procedures regarding a nonpunitive safety reporting program. The relevance of such a program for aviation industry safety
is then explored using ICAO regulations and other Civil Aviation Authorities as a benchmarking
for assessing current Brazilian Civil Aviation Reporting Systems, identifying gaps, and potential
benefits of implementing such a program.
Then, the potential benefits will be validated using a research questionnaire and
interviews with the leading airline industry safety managers and stakeholders like the pilots’
association and CAA safety managers. This research’s results will be presented and discussed.
Finally, we will conclude by presenting the main gaps in the Brazilian Civil Aviation Regulation,
the potential benefits of implementing a non-punitive safety reporting program and suggesting
topics for further investigations.
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Chapter II
Review of the Relevant Literature
Aviation is a highly regulated industry with a solid regulatory basis. For this reason, it
can present several challenges for the implementation of new procedures or recommendations.
This literature review will cover the following aspects:
● State Safety Program: as a way of introducing the theme involving hazard identification,
risk management, and the leading role of regulatory agencies.
●

The Brazilian Civil Aviation Safety Oversight: This section is quite relevant in
understanding the way the Brazilian State is structure and how both Aviation Authorities
work together in the Oversight of the Brazilian Aviation industry.

● Actual Status of Brazilian CAA on Safety Management: approaches the status of the
Brazilian CAA regarding external audits and how the Brazilian State ASR program is
inserted into the SMS context.
● The Role of a Reporting Program under the Scope of an SMS: The safety reporting
programs are part of the foundations of any Safety Management System and this section
describes how relevant they are for organizations and civil aviation authorities.
● The Risk Management Cycle of Voluntary Report and the Importance of Reporting
Confidentiality: This section describes the process and flow of information in the risk
management of a voluntary report and also the relevance of confidentiality under the
scope of a voluntary reporting program.
● Brazilian Authorities current types of Air Safety Reports: describes six types of report
programs under the scope of three different Brazilian aviation authorities.
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● The Potential of the ASO and "Flight Alerts": approaches two ANAC disclosure
documents disseminating safety recommendations emitted by ANAC, based on hazards
identified by other means than safety report programs.
● Federal Aviation Authority - Aviation Safety Action Program: better understanding the
policy of the American regulatory specifications and comparing it to what we have in
Brazil.
● FAA Voluntary Report Gathering Strategy and Regulatory Support for Confidential
Reports: approaches different FAA report gathering programs, complementary to ASAP
but each one with its purpose. Besides it, the authors accessed the law protection over
confidential reports available in the USA and Brazil.
● Other Authorities Non-Punitive Safety Reporting Programs: better understanding the
policy of two other aviation authorities (EASA and Australian), assessing what is
available from authorities in other countries.
● International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations Perspective on Non-Punitive
Safety Reporting Programs: approaches a stakeholder view of reporting programs. Pilots
are just one class of frontline personnel dealing with unwanted situations in aviation daily
activities. Therefore, essential for filling reports, which feeds the program.
● Safety Culture and Reporting: the focus on incident and accident prevention, and
continuous improvement through reporting.
● Just Culture and Human Factors: a brief contextualization of the importance of the
establishment of a positive culture of confidence and collaborative community attitude
towards the common goal of safety enhancement.
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State Safety Program
In general terms, item 8.2.2.1 of Doc 9859 (ICAO, 2018) defines State Safety Program
(SSP) as “An SSP is an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety.”
After World War II, the United States invited other nations to debate the next steps in
world aviation development. This invitation was extended to several countries. It became known
worldwide as the first International Civil Aviation Conference, simply the Chicago Convention.
This historic conference laid the foundation for standards and procedures for peaceful global air
navigation in a safe and orderly manner. It also formalized the creation of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), defined by DOC 7300 (Convention on International Civil
Aviation). In this context, “each Contracting State has complete autonomy over the airspace
above its territory and the portion of water adjacent to its territory”. (DOC 7300, 2006).
ICAO would be responsible for organizing and supporting the intensive international
cooperation that the fledgling global air transport network would require. In this context, safety
is the highest priority of the ICAO Strategic Objectives (GASP, DOC 10004).
As defined in DOC 7300, Article 37, each contracting State must ensure the adoption of
practices following regulations and standards, so that the focus is always on the safety of air
operations. In pursuit of this standardization, ICAO adopted the use of Annexes to the Chicago
Convention.
Under ICAO (DOC 9734), each ICAO Annex presents specifications known as
International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs).
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“States shall promulgate a comprehensive and effective aviation law, commensurate with
the size and complexity of their aviation activity and consistent with the requirements contained
in the Convention on International Civil Aviation, to enable the oversight and management of
civil aviation” (ANNEX 19, 2016). In this context, according to the ANNEX 19, States shall
establish relevant authorities or agencies, supported by sufficient qualified personnel, and
provided with adequate financial resources. In addition, each state authority or agency shall have
stated safety functions and objectives to fulfill its safety management responsibilities. Also,
according to Annex 19, each State shall establish a State Safety Program (SSP) for the
management of safety in the State to achieve an acceptable level of safety performance in civil
aviation.
An SSP is a management system for the management of
safety by the State. According to Doc 9859 (Figure 5-1 - ICAO,
2018). “Typical safety data and safety information sources,” the SSP
is just one of the many types of safety information that the state must
manage.
Figure 2: ICAO Contracting State responsibilities. Source: ICAO
The Contracting States must implement and optimize the SARPs contained in the
Annexes to ensure the safety and regularity of operations worldwide. “Chapter 3 of Annex 19
contains SARPs related to the safety management responsibilities of States. This includes the
establishment and maintenance of an SSP intended to manage safety in an integrated manner.”
(ICAO Doc 9859, 2018 - Item 8.1.1).
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The ICAO Safety Management Manual (Doc 9859) defines that the focus on safety
management is to proactively mitigate safety risks before they result in aviation accidents and
incidents. Through implementing safety management, States can manage their safety activities in
a more disciplined, integrative, and focused manner. In addition, possessing a clear
understanding of its role and contribution to safe operations enables a State, and its aviation
industry, to prioritize actions to address safety risks, this will allow agencies to manage their
resources more effectively for the optimal benefit of aviation safety.
The ICAO Safety Management Manual (DOC 9859) establishes that each State is
responsible for creating voluntary event reporting. Furthermore, they are encouraged to establish
other safety data collection and processing systems to collect safety information. This is to
identify an incident or accident that the final report may not capture. According to ICAO DOC
9859 (ICAO, 2018) “The effectiveness of a state’s safety management activities is strengthened
when implemented in a formal and institutionalized way through an SSP and thorough safety
management systems (SMSs) for its service providers."
The SSP is responsible for facilitating and promoting the voluntary reporting of events
that could affect aviation safety by adjusting their applicable laws, regulations, and policies, as
necessary.
In the case of a voluntary reporting system, it shall be operated under safety protection
laws. This allows for the report author's confidentiality to be ensured. Further, organizations
need to have an appropriate disciplinary policy accessible to all. It should also be widely
understood. The disciplinary policy should indicate what behaviors are unacceptable. The policy
should also indicate how the organization will respond in such cases. It needs to be applied
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fairly, reasonably, and consistently. Finally, organizations and individuals are more likely to
report their experiences and errors in an environment where they will not be judged or mistreated
by their peers or employers.
Overall, organizations and individuals must believe they will be supported when
reporting situations in the interest of safety. This includes organizational and personal errors and
mistakes. An increase in the confidential report rates, as well as a decrease in anonymous reports,
usually, indicate the organization's progress towards creating a more positive safety culture.

The Brazilian Civil Aviation Safety Oversight

The Brazilian Civil Aviation System management is under the responsibilities of two
different organizations of the Brazilian State. The Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority is
responsible for the supervision of the Civil Aviation as a whole, including aerodromes, airlines,
design organizations and manufacturers of aeronautical products, pilots and maintenance
workshops, as well as security against acts of unlawful interference and economic regulation,
among other aspects. The Air Force Command (COMAER) is the aeronautical authority and
under its structure, the Department of Airspace Control (DECEA) provides the air traffic control
service and the CENIPA is the central piece of the Brazilian Aeronautical Accident Investigation
and Prevention System investigation authority.
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Figure 3 - Structure of the Brazilian Civil Aviation Management
The governance of the Brazilian Civil Aviation system requires permanent coordination
between these two authorities as both of them have responsibilities and obligations as established
in the Programa de Segurança Operacional – BR (Brazilian Operational Safety Program).
For the purposes of this project, the most important aspect that should be highlighted is
the fact that the only voluntary reporting program in the Brazilian state is under the supervision
of CENIPA, through the RCSV (Confidential Report on Operational Safety) program. For this
purpose, on August 23, 2021, Ordinance No. 5.754/COMAER/ANAC was published, which
establishes the Provisions on the Reporting System for the Brazilian Civil Aviation. This
document defines the criteria for sharing information between CENIPA and ANAC and, for the
objective of this study, item 5. Voluntary Reporting program is the most relevant, as the extract
below:
5.4 Reporting to the Center for Investigation and Prevention of Aeronautical Accidents CENIPA for Flight Safety (RCSV) is an integral part of the Brazilian State's voluntary reporting
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system, and, as a source of the Aeronautical Accident Investigation and Prevention System SIPAER, it has its protection guaranteed by Law No. 12.970, of May 8, 2014.
5.5 The RCSV will receive primary treatment by CENIPA, and operational safety
information will not be made available before de-identification.
5.6 The information collected through the RCSV has as its main purpose the survey of
statistical data to support analysis and actions to improve operational safety.
Due to the characteristics of the RCSV described above, mainly the fact that the
information will not be made available (including to the ANAC) before de-identification, the
RCSV program does not have the characteristics that could make it a non-punitive self-report
program that could be adopted or adapted by ANAC for this purpose. In other words, this deidentification process ends up removing the possibility of non-punitiveness by the agency and
also might not allow the timely management of information.

Actual Status of Brazilian CAA on Safety Management
According to ANAC RASO 2019 (Relatório Anual de Segurança Operacional, or Annual
Operational Safety Report), within the scope of the Brazilian State, the Brazilian CAA is
responsible for presenting activities related to the USOAP-CMA (Universal Safety Oversight
Audit Program – Continuous Monitoring Approach). This is the Program through which the
ICAO monitors the fulfillment of the safety oversight obligations by its Member States (ICAO,
2021).
In addition, the Brazilian CAA also acts on the Management of Operational Safety
recommendations arising from the final investigation reports of occurrences produced by
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CENIPA (Centro de Investigação e Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos). This organization is
the equivalent of the Brazilian NTSB (National Transport Safety Board).
In this context, according to the RASO 2019 Report, the Brazilian agency presented
excellent parameters related to safety management, as shown in the graph below. The Report
compares the percentage of effective implementation in the USOAP Program with the volume of
air traffic in each State. States in the same region are represented by the same color.
In the figure, Brazil is highlighted, in the upper right corner, where the countries with a
large volume of air traffic and a high degree of adherence to international safety standards are
located, according to the ICAO audit carried out in 2015 and 2018 (ANAC, 2020, p. 10).

Figure 4: ANAC Power BI on LOC-G (Loss of Control - On Ground) data from 2010 to
2019 Source: ANAC
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On its website, ANAC (2021) lists five key processes of an SMS, reproduced below:


Report on Safety Issues and Events: a process of data and information acquisition
related to safety.



Identification of Hazards: a set of activities aimed to identify dangers related to
the organization.



Risk Management: a standardized process for evaluation and definition of actions
to risk control.



Performance Measurement: management tools developed to evaluate if the safety
objectives of the organization were achieved.



Safety Guarantee: a set of activities used to standardize the delivery of services
according to the criteria of performance established.

Among other tools and programs, the FAA ASAP is an example of a program in which a
CAA uses a Safety Report System to manage the aviation operational risk. The System utilizes a
standardized process of hazard categorization, to continuously evaluate risks and enhance the
KPIs related to operational safety. The usage of Business Intelligence (BI) tools is necessary to
manage the vast amount of information generated in this activity.

The Role of a Reporting Program Under the Scope of an SMS
According to the FAA, SMS is defined as “The formal, top-down business approach to
managing safety risk, which includes a systemic approach to managing safety, including the
necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures”. SMS is a method
of flight safety management with the objective of understanding and mitigating operational risks
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in a systemic manner. Voluntary and non-punitive reporting can be an approach, part of an SMS
aimed at improving flight safety.

Safety Culture and Safety Reporting
The concept of safety culture began after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. According to
the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), "INSAG concluded that the need to
create and maintain a ‘safety culture is a precondition for ensuring nuclear power plant safety.
The concept of ‘safety culture’ relates to a very general concept of dedication and personal
responsibility of all those involved in any safety-related activity at a nuclear power plant”.
Operating under strong organizational safety culture requests all the company levels involved.
“Safety culture presupposes total psychological dedication to safety, which is primarily created
by the attitude of the administrative staff of the organizations engaged in the development and
operation of nuclear power plants” (INSAG-7).
Experts say that the crash of the Continental Express flight 2574, due to structural failure
in flight caused by inadequate maintenance, was the most important marker of safety culture in
the United States (NTSB, 1992).
According to Chilakalapudi (2016), “the purpose of safety reporting in the aviation
industry is to ensure that an organization receives safety-related information which could then be
used to manage and improve safety within that organization. (Davies, 2015; Cicero, 2008).
As cited earlier in this study, ASR processing is a manner to acquire sensitive
information. According to Hudson (2008), there are three methods that are used in acquiring
information for risk management: reporting, audits and accidents and major incidents. Therefore,
ASR processing is part of a proactive approach type of risk management.
Generally, an "in-house" ASR workflow runs like depicted in the picture below.
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Figure 5: Typical Aviation Safety Report Process.

As in the example above, the Brazilian CAA does not interact at any time with the
process. Professionals who wish to report threatening situations cannot do so directly to the
Brazilian state if that were their wish. Later in this study, the options available to the flight
professional who wants to fill out some type of safety report within the scope of the Brazilian
aeronautical authorities will be approached.
Pilots (or employees) generate safety reports. In turn, reports can produce “Findings,”
which need to be answered by the affected department with an "Action Plan." This action plan is
then submitted to the SMS manager. This manager is accountable for approving or requesting
enhancements to the proposed action plan. This system is credited to the SMS framework's third
pillar, Safety Risk Management (ICAO DOC 9859, 2018).
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Without safety reports, there is no way to develop action plans. Even worst, the Brazilian
CAA cannot process the above-cited chain because there is no provision of an ASR program
designed by ANAC.
According to ICAO DOC 9859, safety culture is a natural consequence of human factors
in complex environments such as aviation. As mentioned earlier, this document defines safety
culture as "how people behave in relation to safety and risk when no one is watching.” (ICAO
DOC 9859).

Just Culture and Human Factors

According to Dekker (2007), culture is like a definition between the acceptable and the
unacceptable. A safety culture based on a just culture can be the key in exonerating
responsibility, however, giving different approaches, considering the individual as a human
being subject to error. “Saying that others’ behavior is erroneous or risky or reckless is our
judgment of what other people do, not a description of the essence of their behavior. 3 In other
words, if we categorize behavior, we do nothing more than categorizing our own judgments”.
According to Dekker (2007), when we talk about voluntary reporting and just culture,
what pilots see as necessary to report may go beyond what is mandatory by the company. “The
language in the Eurocontrol rules suggests that reporting should be compulsory. All safety
occurrences need to be reported. A lot of organizations have taken it to mean just that and have
told their employees that they are obligated to report safety occurrences. But this might make
little sense. Why does research show that a voluntary system is better, leaving it to people’s own
judgment to report or not? Mandatory reporting implies that everybody has the same definition
of what is risky, what is worthy of reporting. This, of course, is seldom the case. The airline
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captain who maintained omertà on his own flight deck could— in principle— be compelled to
report all incidents and safety occurrences, as Eurocontrol would suggest. But the captain
probably has different ideas about what is risky and worth reporting than his organization”
People as human beings make mistakes. However, taking the blame knowing the
possibility of being punished, may not be attractive to voluntary reporting. Finding a culprit and
putting the whole situation on top of that, ends up missing the bigger problems, such as
organizational problems. If this happens, the reports may not be faithful to the situations nor a
preventive idea regarding the application of flight safety. This could result in these "unrealistic"
reports are not useful (Dekker, 2005).
People are judged on their behavior. For this reason, pilots may fail to report something
they did or saw. Dekker explains that our actions are explained in terms of what we were seeing
at that time and with the tools available at that time as well. That's local rationality. People make
mistakes and they can report it or not. “People’s errors and mistakes (such as there are in any
objective sense) are systematically coupled to their circumstances and tools and tasks. Indeed,
the most important empirical regularity of human factor research since the mid-1940s is the local
rationality principle. What people do makes sense to them at the time—it must, otherwise, they
would not do it. People do not come to work to do a bad job; they are not out to crash into cars or
airplanes or ground ships. The local rationality principle, originating in Simon (1969), says that
people do things that are reasonable, or rational, based on their limited knowledge, goals, and
understanding of the situation and their limited resources at the time” (Woods et al., 1994).
Therefore, what is reasonable for an organization may or may not be for an individual.
When we talk about reports, there is the possibility that this report is about an error made
in a certain situation. Another important thing for the treatment of a given report is to be able to
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understand what the individual's situation was at the time the facts happened and if what was
reported and referenced made sense to him. (Dekker, 2007). Therefore, this individual will not
necessarily be making an isolated error, but it may be an error linked to the organization or other
external factors that went unnoticed. This can directly impact non-punitive reporting, as people
may be afraid or insecure in reporting, especially when dealing with organizational situations. In
an organization, there is a chance that this individual will not be heard for a reported situation or
error. The individual's point of view may not be considered when dealing with an organizational
problem that impacted the work environment and may have led him to act as he did. (Dekker,
2002).
Aviation is considered a complex system. The concept of the human factor is already
accepted as an existing factor in this environment. Also, bearing in mind that there is a gap
between theory and practice (O'Hare, 2000).

The Risk Management Cycle of Voluntary Report and the Importance of Reporting
Confidentiality
Besides the above-cited FAA Order 8000.82, another document bringing support to
ASAP is the FAA Advisory Circular (FAA, AC120-66C). It states in its introduction that
“Under an ASAP, safety issues are resolved through corrective action rather than through
punishment or discipline.”
In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that the RCSV also has a similar corrective
action production as the result of a safety report. Nonetheless, CENIPA (which is the
investigating authority, but not the regulatory authority in Brazil) has not the same enforcement
power as the National CAA (ANAC). Under a custom-designed SMS framework, ANAC could
directly request corrective action plans from flight service providers (organizations) under its
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jurisdiction, when a program like ASAP identifies a hazard in the operations field. In a simple
way of saying, this is an example of a risk management cycle.
As nowadays CENIPA is responsible for receiving safety reports (RCSV program), an
interaction formal process with ANAC is necessary to make it happen. As a parallel, it would be
as if the NTSB received voluntary reports (like ASAP, for instance), instead of the FAA. But the
FAA would process it only after the report deidentification being made by the NTSB, in the
effort to protect the reporter id. A potential problem in this process is the impossibility of proper
treatment of reports. This is explained by the fact that, after reaching CENIPA's care, the reports
are filtered before being sent to ANAC for the risk management activities request process. In
order to avoid the possibility of inadvertently identifying the author of the report, essential
information is often removed (filtered) from the report. In the end, the appropriate sector of the
affected organization is prejudiced to present an effective corrective action plan, by lack of
pivotal information. The problem is that an action plan is the greatest result of the process of
handling voluntary reports, as it can prevent future recurrences.
In this context, two months before this study completion, the Brazilian aviation
authorities publicized the “Portaria Conjunta Nº 5.754 (from August 23 rd, 2021) which approves
the “Reporting System for Brazilian Civil Aviation.” It is a joined regulation, uniting two of the
Brazilian Aviation Authorities - COMAER (Brazilian Air Force Command) and ANAC
(Brazilian CAA). The initiative seeks to “improve the mandatory and voluntary reporting
mechanism of occurrences, which is handled by the COMAER and ANAC, as an integral part of
the Brazilian Program for the Operational Safety of Civil Aviation (PSO-BR).”
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ANAC's "Procedure Manual for Aeronautical Occurrences Management" (MPR), issued
by ANAC’s Safety Advisory Department (ASIPAER – Assessoria do Sistema de Prevenção de
Acidentes Aeronáuticos), manages the processing of RCSV along with CENIPA. It describes
RCSV processing interaction among the Brazilian CAA with the Brazilian NTSB.
The picture below describes the flow until the designated aeronautical organization’s
department receives the document requiring the safety occurrence (object of the RCSV) for
analysis and action submission.
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Figure 6: RCSV Process. Source:

Considering the requirements of Annex 19, item 5.1.3 regarding the “establishment of a
voluntary safety reporting system to collect safety data and safety information not captured by
mandatory safety reporting systems,” the RCSV-CENIPA program does fulfill this requirement.
Although, its processes require extensive collaborative information exchange and coordination
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among two different Brazilian aviation authorities. In this context, Howell (2019) mentions that
“difficult reporting processes” is one of the biggest challenges to obtain safety reports from
frontline personnel. If the report perceives a long time to receive feedback about the report
issued, the person tends to feel discouraged to do so. Howell also cites that “overly complicated
reporting processes increase the chances of system failure, and overly complicated systems are
seldom long-lasting and not sustainable.”
Nonetheless, it’s worth mentioning the ICAO recommends that “State authorities with
responsibilities for the implementation of the SSP should have access to the SDCPS to support
their safety responsibilities.” (ICAO Doc 9859, item 5.1.5, 2018).
Considering “ASAP requires analysis and corrective action” (FAA AC 120-92B, Chapter
3-5 c. (7) (f) 3), it is worth mentioning that the ASAP program is just one among others
voluntary safety report programs made available by the FAA to fulfill the requirements of the
ICAO legislation regarding the hazard identification and risk management program from Annex
19.
It does for FAA SMS legislation (AC 120-92B), and for ANAC SMS legislation (RBAC
121 subpart BB 121.1229); for ICAO SMS legislation is Annex 19 Chapter 5.1.3 (“States shall
establish a voluntary safety reporting system to collect safety data and safety information not
captured by mandatory safety reporting systems.”)According to Steckel (2014), the ASAP and
Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (VDRP) - other FAA voluntary ASR- did not address
how an organization or its employees’ perception of its safety culture or a voluntary safety
reporting programs before its implementation. The point to be considered is how this perception
can affect the success or failure of the program.
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For this reason, the conducting of research among pilots of the affected organization or
communities is relevant. This point will be addressed by this study in the next chapter,
Methodology.

Federal Aviation Authority - Aviation Safety Action Program
In the context of ASR programs, one consolidated example comes from the FAA. As
mentioned on its website, ASAP encourages voluntary reporting of safety issues identified by
employees (FAA, 2021). Its goal is to enhance aviation safety through the prevention of
accidents and incidents. Due to inherent limitations, the scope of this study is restricted to pilots,
but in fact, all personnel involved with aeronautical operations should be encompassed by any
ASR program.

There are numerous safety data gathering programs across the global aviation system. In
addition, a massive effort has been made to convince pilots about the benefits of the voluntary
report (Steckel, 2014). Counting on pilots to voluntarily report hazards, risks, their lapses,
mistakes, and errors have proven to be a challenge. Among other factors, this is a result of the
lack of trust in its non-punitive nature (The Mobility Forum, 2016).

Aware of this fact, ASAP regulation has strong support “to encourage an employee to
voluntarily report safety issues even though they may involve an alleged violation, enforcementrelated incentives have been designed into the program” (FAA, 2021). Besides it, the ASAP is
customized to each organization (not restricted to airlines). It is constituted on a formal
agreement embracing the company, the National CAA, and a representative of the employee’s
labor organization.
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The strategy is to achieve a substantial compromise among the aeronautical community.
From a simplistic point of view, ASR contains nothing more than precious specific information.
This type of information is sensitive and maybe would never be gathered – and worked on without the aviation personnel contribution. This contribution only occurs based on confidence.
The safety culture has a crucial role in this chain, as this study will approach further.

FAA Voluntary Report Gathering Strategy and ASAP Regulatory Support

Apart from ASAP, FAA has developed a “network” of nine other voluntary reporting
programs. Each of them processes confidential information to foster safety concerns without fear
of retaliation due to its non-punitive protection.
These programs embrace personnel from specific aviation sectors, as the aircraft
certification process, airports, air traffic control, FAA employees (as engineers and architects),
and finally to all participants in the NAS who wish to voluntarily report safety incidents and
situations.
This approach used by the FAA, on collecting and processing thousands of aviation
personnel reports is an example of a proactive strategy to manage risks. “The aviation
community has moved away from the “forensic” approach of making safety improvements based
solely on accident investigations to a proactive strategy that incorporates a mix of actual flight
data, data from other government agencies, and voluntarily submitted information from airline
employees.” (FAA, 2021)
Another important pillar for the ASAP program concerns safety data and safety
information protection. The ICAO Annex 19 (2016) states:
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5.3.1 States shall accord protection to safety data captured by, and safety
information derived from, voluntary safety reporting systems and related sources
in accordance with Appendix 3.
The first document which brings support to the ASAP program is the FAA Order
8000.82, concerning “Information as Protected from Public Disclosure under 14 CFR Part 193”
(FAA, 2021). This is crucial to guarantee the reporter and the information brought from
disclosure. This seeks to ensure the protection of people who report situations of risk so that they
are not victims of persecution or revenge by managers not yet familiarized with the concept of
Just Culture.
Analyzing the RBAC list, there is no equivalent Brazilian document to the14 CFR Part
193. In the Brazilian state jurisdiction, voluntary confidential reports are protected under three
types of regulation:


The “Normas do Comando da Aeronáutica 3-3” (NSCA 3-3), which rules the flight safety
management in Brazilian aviation. It states each RCSV processing is based on the
concept of “voluntariness” and “non-punishment,” and that the program's success is
intrinsically linked to the guarantee of confidentiality of the source of information.
(Ministery of Defense, 2013)



the “Instruções do Comando da Aéronáutuca 3-7” (ICA 3-7), a Brazilian publication
designed to disseminate rules and facilitate the application of laws and regulations. It
states that concerning the guarantee of confidentiality, CENIPA guarantees the reporter's
anonymity in all cases in which reported events to refer to the prevention of aeronautical
occurrences (ANAC, 2021).



The Brazilian Federal Law 12.970 (2014), which states that data from the voluntary
notification systems of occurrences "will not be used for evidential purposes in legal
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proceedings and administrative procedures and will only be provided upon judicial
request."
Despite the mentioned protections to the identity of the volunteer reporter, there is a
major problem to be resolved so that non-punishment is really guaranteed. Due to the complete
record of each activity carried out by any airline (technology and audits facilitate and require it),
there is comprehensive data that documents the participation of each machine, location,
individual (or team) in all flight operations and support activities. This allows any accountable
manager (responsible for implementing an action plan - in response to an identified hazard) to
identify the reporter (or the most likely individuals). Thus, if the manager is not solidly aware of
the positive influence of just culture on the efficiency of his department (and, therefore, his
organization), reporters are subject to punishment (often veiled) by their superiors or even of
their peers.

Other Authorities Non-Punitive Safety Reporting Programs

EASA Confidential Safety Reporting
In accordance with the ICAO Safety State Program and in line with the industry best
practices, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency - EASA has in its documents a set of
regulations to enable individuals to report malpractices and irregularities, without worrying about
any adverse consequences to the reporter.
The EASA Confidential Safety Reporting requires each of the Member States and
Agencies to establish a voluntary reporting system, used to collect safety-related information not
captured by other safety programs. The EASA Confidential Safety Reporting sole objective is
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the prevention of accidents and incidents. It should not be used to attribute blame or liability
(European Union Aviation Safety Agency, 2014).
Even though the EASA regulation states that the sole objective of its safety reporting
program is the prevention of accidents. The regulation uses the Just Culture concept, which is
defined by EASA as a system to “encourage individuals to report safety-related information. It
should not, however, absolve individuals of their normal responsibilities. In this context,
employees and contracted personnel should not be subject to any prejudice based on information
provided under this Regulation, except in cases of willful misconduct or where there has been
manifest, severe and serious disregard with respect to an obvious risk and profound failure of
professional responsibility to take such care as is required in the circumstances, causing
foreseeable damage to a person or property, or seriously compromising the level of aviation
safety” (European Union Aviation Safety Agency, 2014).
The just culture concept is important for any safety reporting program, especially because
it can create a good safety culture, and because it provides a clear definition of acceptable and
unacceptable behaviors.
Another important aspect addressed in the EASA regulation is the fact that any
unpremeditated or inadvertent infringements of the local laws that are only reported through the
Confidential Safety Reporting program “should not be the subject of disciplinary, administrative
or legal proceedings, unless where otherwise provided by applicable national criminal law”
(European Union Aviation Safety Agency, 2014).

Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) – Aviation Self Reporting
The Australian Safety Bureau has its own non-punitive safety reporting program. It is
called Aviation Self Reporting (ASRS). The name of the program already denotes the purpose of
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such a program. Under the ASRS program, any individual can report any contravention of the
rules or requirements established by the Australian Civil Aviation Authority (CASA).
For the Australian Civil Aviation Authority, as per Act 63 from 1988, a contravention is
defined as:
“Reportable contravention means a contravention of the regulations, other than the
following:
(a) a contravention that is deliberate.
(b) a contravention that is fraudulent.
(c) a contravention that causes or contributes to an accident or to a serious incident
(whether before or after the contravention is reported);
(d) a contravention of a regulation that is prescribed for the purposes of this paragraph.
From the contravention definitions, it is clear that the non-punitive protection given by
the ASRS program is for mistakes and errors made by the aviation personal while performing
their duties.
Another important aspect of the Australian regulation is the fact that administrative
protection can be claimed once every 5 years (30DO of the Civil Aviation Act, 1988 ).
To be considered as an ASRS and take the protection against any administrative action,
the reporter should also report the issue within 10 days of the event and before receiving the
show cause notice for the proposed decision. Those restrictions make clear the purpose of the
Australian non-punitive safety reporting program, which is to give protection of any
administrative action in exchange for safety-related information.

38
International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations Perspective on Non-Punitive Safety
Reporting Programs
The Pilots are an important stakeholder for the implementation of a non-punitive safety
reporting program by the ANAC, especially because they must feel comfortable with how the
program is structured and how the safety information will be handled. The International
Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations (IFALPA) represents over 100,000 pilots in nearly
100 countries worldwide and can be used as a representation of the Pilots’ stance about the nonpunitive reporting programs.
According to IFALPA (2012), “It is widely recognized that a focus on the human factors
associated with aircraft accidents and incidents is needed to further improve air safety, and a
voluntary confidential reporting scheme can be an important part of that approach.
The Pilots actions and performance are in most times affected by conditions that are not
under their control. In this scenario, the errors are more consequences and not root causes
(IFALPA, 2008). In such a situation of unintended errors or deviations from the regulations,
“only in exceptional circumstances involving criminal action, intentional or gross negligence,
should blame be apportioned” (IFALPA, 2008).
The non-punitive environment or culture does not give immunity from consequences but
gives fair treatment for pilots who proactively reports their mistakes, even if it includes the
unintentional non-compliance of any regulation.
For the IFALPA (2008), “States must ensure that legislation is passed that enforces the
non-punitive philosophy. Aviation safety can be enhanced by the establishment of a non-punitive
culture, the focus of which is safety rather than the apportionment of blame”.
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Brazilian Authorities current types of Air Safety Reports
Currently, ANAC makes available to the Brazilian aeronautical community five types of
operational safety reports, reproduced below:
o Denúncia sobre Segurança Operacional (Denunciation affecting Operational Safety):
To denounce violations and crimes directly to ANAC. The Just Culture is not
embraced in this report. In other words, there is no focus on safety management in
this report.
o Reporte de Infrações de Tráfego Aéreo (Air Traffic Infraction Report): devoted to
report air traffic infractions.
o Reporte de Dificuldade em Serviço (Difficulty in Service Report): to report an aircraft
mechanic malfunction as per RBACs 21.3, 121.703, 135.415 e 145.221.
o Comunicação de Evento de Segurança Operacional (Operational Safety Event
Communication): devoted to informing unwanted events that occurred on an airport
site.
o Relatório de Prevenção – RELPREV (Prevention Report): a form devoted to bringing
information regarding safety direct to the organization where a threat or risk was
identified. There is no interaction with the CAA.
o

Relatório ao CENIPA para a Segurança de Voo - RCSV (Flight Safety Report to
CENIPA): other CENIPA forms, to report, situations which may affect aviation
safety directly to the Brazilian NTSB. For instance, when a previous RELPREV was
not sufficient to generate adequate action plans to mitigate risk. It can protect the
reporter id.
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It would be simpler if they all shared a single platform for submission. The impeding
reason is that the subject's content varies from one to another, and the desired treatment for the
report vary for each case. Besides it, each type of report is correctly directed to the sector
responsible for the solutions or adopting measures to be implemented (ANAC, 2016).
The above-cited reports are not required to have a flow like that of ASRs processed
internally by airlines (see Figure 6- Typical Aviation Safety Report Process), as they were not
conceived under the SMS framework, which arose in 2009 (ICAO, 2018).

The Potential of the ASO and "Flight Alerts"
One of the potential outcomes of an ASR (Air Safety Report) Program by the Brazilian
CAA is supporting the increase in the quantity of Operational Safety Alerts (ASO, in
Portuguese) issued by ANAC. An ASO is an informative short paper widely disseminated to the
Brazilian aeronautical community by ANAC. It is a tool to alert civil aviation operators about
identified Hazards and unwanted situations likely to occur during operations. An ASO may
contain recommendations for actions to be taken by aeronautical organizations. As a result, it
contributes to avoiding or mitigating Hazards that could lead to incidents or accidents (ANAC,
2021).
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Figure 7: Reproduction of an ANAC ASO Document. Source: ANAC
In addition to the ASOs, ANAC also issues documents entitled "Flight Alerts" (Alerta de
voo, ANAC 2021). They consist of publications from aeronautical accidents investigations
(reactive safety management approach) or situations in which the CAA identifies potential risks
to air operations - predictive or proactive approach (Hsu, 2007).
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ASR processed by ANAC would bring more information to support the increase of
ASO’s and Flight Alerts quantity. This is important if we consider that successful action plans
placed by one company do not carry the chance to be implemented by its peers – if they identify
it as pertinent, of course.
As per the ICAO Doc 9859, each organization has its own culture and particularities.
Therefore, a successful action plan implemented by one organization does not mean that it will
have the same effect on other companies, even if they operate in the same market (ICAO, 2018).
It is appropriate that each one decides on their own if they should implement the same
action plan, adapt it, or do not take it by any means. To guarantee the chance to evaluate it is
something possible to be built if ANAC implements its own ASR program.
One of CENIPA’s Flight Safety slogans is: “In accident prevention, there are no secrets,
nor flags." (Filosofia SIPAER). That being so, there is a culture of exchanging sensitive
information and safety action plans within the aeronautical community, “on-demand.” It is
facilitated by a positive Safety Culture and Just Culture. Still, these sensitive information and
safety action plans adopted by each organization are restricted to its sole database and
operational security management platform.
The Brazilian regular air transport carriers are governed by RBAC 121. On its subpart
BB, RBAC 121 requires air operators to conduct a formal process to identify hazards and their
consequences, so that each risk is then classified as intolerable or tolerable with mitigation. An
action plan must be implemented for each identified hazard (ANAC, 2021).
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Each Brazilian regular air transport carrier must have robust Safety Departments to seek
and manage the risks of their identified threats. They issue their own safety alerts, but it is a
process that is intrinsically restricted to internal use.
The strength of an ASO issued by ANAC can help prevent unwanted occurrences within
all the air operators. They are within easy reach of the entire aeronautical community.

Summary
This literature review is only a small part of all the available literature available about the
non-punitive reporting programs. According to the other countries CAA regulations, articles,
books and manuals, the non-punitive safety reporting programs are a relevant subject for the
airline industry safety and need to be approached worldwide, with a focus on creating and
maintaining a favourable ambient to a strong voluntary reporting system and non-punishment.
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Chapter III
Methodology
This research project focused on exploring the potential benefits of implementing a nonpunitive voluntary safety report by the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority. This chapter presents
the methodology that was used to understand the cultural aspects of Safety Reporting. In
addition, the Chapter focused on understanding how airline pilots and safety managers perceive
the non-punitive reporting programs in the aviation industry.
Unlike other careers in the air transport industry, airline pilots receive training aimed at
operational safety and the culture of voluntary and mandatory reporting from the earliest stages
of their careers. In addition to scope limitation issues, this study was designed to survey cultural
aspects of safety reporting only among licensed airline transport pilots working for a company
operating under the requirements of RBAC 121.
Nevertheless, to be effective, a voluntary reporting program must allow all employees
from any area of an airline to participate by issuing reports and receiving feedback on the results
of their contributions. According to the FAA, “ASAPs can be used as part of the employee
reporting system for the employee groups covered by the ASAPs. However, the confidential
employee reporting system required by part 5 must include all employees in the company.”
(FAA AC 120-92B, 5-2. (2) (b))
A questionnaire with nine questions was distributed to collect the Airline Pilots'
perspectives about implementing a non-punitive voluntary safety report program by the Brazilian
Civil Aviation Authority. The results of the questionnaires were tabulated.
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Besides the form, a structured interview was prepared for Safety Managers of Brazilian
airlines, ANAC, and the Pilot’s Association. In addition to the questionnaire, this interview
brought the perspective of the different stakeholders involved in the Safety Reporting Program.
The results of the questionnaire and interviews are described in Chapter IV.

Experimental Design
The researchers designed two types of experiments to be applied:


A questionnaire to be answered by Airline Pilots to have a sample of the
population perception about the implementation of a non-punitive safety reporting
program by the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority.



An interview with five questions was conducted with Airline Safety Managers,
Pilots Association representatives, and ANAC managers.

Data Collection and Analysis
This research methodology used primary sources, such as the questionnaire and interview
forms, and secondary sources, such as ANAC data available regarding the number of airline
pilots with currently issued licenses.

Questionnaire - Data Collection

The Implementation of a Non-Punitive Operational Safety Reporting Program
questionnaire was designed with the focus on airline pilots. It was distributed by social media
and the Airline Pilots Association. The questionnaire was a set of 9 multiple choice questions
and one open question for additional comments. The questions are listed below:
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1. Gender
● Female
● Male
● N/A
2. Age
● 20 or less
● 21 to 30
● 31 to 40
● 41 to 50
● 51 to 60
● 61 or more
3. Professional Position
●

Captain

●

First Officer

4. Operation type
●

Regular Airline (RBAC 121)

●

Air Taxi (RBAC 135)

●

Private (RBAC 91)

5. Flight Experience (flight hours)
●

150 - 500

●

500 - 1000

●

1000 - 2500

●

2500 - 5000
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●

5000 or more

6. Have you ever filled out a Safety Report for your company, reporting an error made by

you?
●

Yes / No

7. Have you ever filled out an RCSV (CENIPA) reporting an error you made?
●

Yes / No

8. If ANAC implements a Safety Reporting program that protects you from any

administrative sanction, would you report a mistake?
●

Yes / No

9. In this case, where ANAC implements a Non-Punitive Safety Reporting program, you

would report an error to: (Select one or more options)
● ANAC
● Your Company's Reporting Program
● RCSV (CENIPA)
● Would not report
10. Additional Comments

The main objective of this questionnaire was to understand the credibility that a possible
Non-Punitive Safety Reporting program from ANAC would have with the group of pilots. The
most relevant question for this research project was Question Nine. It proposed a situation to the
respondent, where pilots answer if they would choose the reporting program already knownwithin the airline of employment, or the one made available by the Brazilian NTSB, or the use of
a possible new program implemented by the Brazilian CAA – more than one option was
accepted as a valid answer.
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Therefore, this Question concentrated on how comfortable pilots would feel about the
new program. This factor was relevant, as set out in Chapter Two- heading "Punitive Safety
Reporting Programs". As potential safety information producers, pilots are essential stakeholders
in the implementation of this program.
The Questions numbered from One to Five aimed to better understand the sample
demographic information. Thus, it allowed applying filters to better understand the pilots'
expectations, according to a given group (pilots operating under RBAC 121).
Questions Six and Seven were targeted to identify the pilot's previous experience
regarding safety reports.
Although slightly like question nine, question eight only provided information about
whether the pilots would use the Brazilian CAA’s Safety Reporting program. Thus, it did not
confront the new program with the one already established in the pilot's routine. For this reason,
it had a different focus them Question Nine.

Questionnaire – Demographic Analysis

A survey was implemented, and we received a total of 525 answers, (472 of them from
Airlines pilots) which represents around 10% of the number of Airline Transport Pilots in the
Brazilian Aviation Market.
The research collected 5 different information points that allowed for a better
understanding of the relevance of the obtained sample. This information included the experience
of the pilots, which can directly influence their perception of the systems currently adopted by
the safety area of their respective airlines.
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The first information point referred to the respondent's gender. See Figure 8. Although it
was not directly related to the objective of this work, it was possible to identify the largest
number of male pilots, which reflected the reality of the job market in this profession itself.

Figure 8: Gender
The pilot's age was relevant for a better understanding of his professional experience. The
longer the time in the profession, the more the pilot was exposed to risky situations. In addition,
the greater the chance that the pilot has made a report to the safety area of the pilot’s company.
The result would be that the pilot was aware of and/or familiar with the current system of
reporting employed by the pilot’s airline.
As it is possible to identify in Figure 9 – Age, more than half of the pilots interviewed are
over 30 years old, which indicates a very relevant experience in aviation.
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Figure 9 - Age

The professional position reflected what role the pilot has onboard and can basically be
divided into two groups: Captain and First Officer. As shown in “Figure 10 - Professional
Position”, our survey counted several participating Captains, relatively higher than the number of
First Officers.
Since the promotion to Captain only happens after years of experience, the fact that this
indicates a greater number of Captains responding to the survey. The survey, therefore, meant
that our sample has many pilots with considerable flying experience. Consequently, the survey
had pilots who have already witnessed threat situations and have probably already made use of
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current reporting systems available in companies. This information was further confirmed by the
results of the flight hours of the respondents.

Figure 10: Professional Position

The type of air transport operation (RBAC 121, 135 or 91) was directly related to the
objective of this work. The research was conducted with several types of pilots. The group this
work was aimed at, and which was the largest possible sample desired was the group of pilots
working for the airlines operating under the RBAC 121. The target group comprised about 90%
of the pilots surveyed. See Figure 11. This was because this type of operation was carried out by
large airlines that usually already have self-report systems for their pilots.
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The other two samples are small and not relevant for the purpose of this work. They
consist of Charter Services and Private Pilots. Therefore, the researchers excluded their
responses from the results before developing the conclusions and recommendations.

Figure 11: Type of Operation
As explained above, the flight experience was added to the age of the pilots and the
ranking to better understand the pilot's experience in situations that put flight safety at risk.
As identified in the previous graphs, the interviewed pilots mostly have vast flying
experience. It was possible to identify in “Figure 11 - Flight Experience” that more than 74% of
the pilots have more than 5,000 hours of flight. This was the highest experience rating present in
our research.
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Figure 12: Flight experience

Interviews - Data Collection
The interview format was designed to collect the safety managers perspective from three
stakeholder's (Airlines, pilots association and Brazilian CAA) over the possibility of a new ASR
program within the scope of the Brazilian CAA. The interview questions are listed below:
For Airline Safety Managers:
1. Does your airline have a Just Culture program in place?
2. If any Pilot self-reports a mistake or error, how is this information managed
internally?
3. Has your organization any policy to protect Pilots that self-report mistakes or
errors against disciplinary actions?
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4. Do you know about any non-punitive safety reporting program established by any
civil aviation authority? If yes, which one?
5. If ANAC establishes a non-punitive safety reporting program, would the airline
be willing to be a participant?

These were the questions asked of the ANAC representatives and Pilots’ Union Safety
Managers:
1. Based on the premise that "the more reports, the better is the risk management", in
the view of your organization, what would be the main point of improvement
pertinent to the current system of voluntary reports made available by the
Brazilian aeronautical authority to encourage an increase in the number of
reports?
2. In your opinion, what should be done to increase the efficiency of the ASR-RCSV
process flow?
3. Beyond that point, what else would you change in the ASR-RCSV processing
flow your institution manages?
4. The latest regulation issued by the Brazilian Aeronautical Authority on Safety
Reports (Portaria Nº 5.754/2021) meets what expectations of your organization?
Does it bring significant process improvements (advantages or disadvantages, if
any)?
5. Do you know about any non-punitive safety reporting program established by any
civil aviation authority? If yes, which one?
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6. If a non-punitive reporting program were created involving these 3 stakeholders
(ANAC, Employee Representative Entity and Airline), would your organization
be willing to participate?
These Questions had three main objectives. The first objective was presented in the
structure of Questions One, Two, and Three. They were designed to access the current level of
the Just Culture program in each of the leading Brazilian airlines today and how it was applied.
Question Four is related to the second objective, which was to access the perspective that
the Airline Safety Managers have about a non-punitive self-reporting program being established
by the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority.
Question Five met the third objective, which was to understand the level of involvement
that each airline would be willing to have, together with ANAC and other companies, in the
collaborative construction of the program that was the focal point of this research. This question
was one of the most important in the survey. It involved the construction of the proposed
program.
As the first three questions did not apply to the ANAC and Pilots’ Union Safety
Managers, they were replaced by other questions that brought relevance to the study.
Question Six’s objective was to compare the answers with the gaps identified in the
methodology of this project.
Questions Seven and Eight were designed to identify whether there were any common
points among stakeholders regarding suggestions for improving the ASR protocol and its process
within the scope of the Brazilian state.
As established in Chapter Two of this work, "State Safety Program," the collaborative
work between airlines and the State was essential for the program's success.
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Interviews – Analysis

The pilot's survey has already added to this project a clear perception of the Airline Pilots
about the program., and a total of seven interviews were carried out. Each interview had at least
two members of this research group. The interviews were performed by videoconference or in
person. All the interviews were voluntary.
During the interviews, there was an opportunity for the interviewees not only to answer
the suggested questions but also to try to express the current challenges of their current
programs. They brought insights for future related programs and whether if this project proposal
would fit into their organization plans.
This work aimed to maintain the anonymity of the interviewees; thus, the names and
positions will not be opened. The respondents were from the three major Brazilian airlines safety
areas, Union representatives and two representatives from ANAC.
The pilot's survey and safety managers interview conclusions and recommendations will
be approached in Chapters Four and Five.
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Chapter IV
Conclusions
This chapter was structured in order to enable a clear and objective understanding of the
results of this research. Thus, a division into 3 sub-chapters was adopted, treating each of the 3
main conclusions independently, and connecting them when appropriate.
First, the 3 conclusions will be presented very objectively, highlighting in bullet points
only the essential aspects of this work. Later in this chapter, each conclusion is presented with
greater detail, where the graphics and research that highlight the main conclusions are given due
emphasis.


Conclusion 1 – Pilots safety reporting culture
o Data Collection method
The data for conclusion 1 was collected using questions 5, 7, 8 and 9 in the survey applied
to Pilots, as per chapter 3 as well as the field available for respondents to write any
additional ideas or comments.
o Results
The data collected shows the Pilots willingness to report errors and mistakes to the National
Civil Aviation Authority in exchange for protection against administrative sanctions.
The various survey respondents reported a lack of confidence in submitting self-reports to
the ANAC. Indeed, they reported greater confidence in reporting directly to the companies;
however, if ANAC implemented a new ASR program that protected the pilot from
administrative sanctions, the pilots would be willing to participate.
If ANAC implemented a new ASR program that protected the pilot from administrative
sanctions, the pilots would be willing to participate.
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o Conclusion
The results and data collected validate the ICAO statement that whether individuals are
willing to report their experiences and errors is mainly dependent on the perceived benefits
and disadvantages associated with the act of reporting (International Civil Aviation
Organization, 2018). We can conclude that respondents were confident in reporting as long
as there is a very clear process with a guarantee of non-punitiveness and the three main
stakeholders agree to participate in a collaborative ASR program. If the Brazilian Civil
Aviation Authority desires to improve the safety data collection using the Safety Reporting
program, a new non-punitive Safety Reporting Program should be implemented by the
Brazilian CAA taking similar strategies like other civil aviation authorities successfully
implemented around the world (see Chapter II).



Conclusion 2 - ICAO Annex 19 fulfillment and the RCSV
o Data collection method
The data for conclusion 2 was collected using the question 6 and 7 in the survey applied
to Pilots, as per chapter 3 as well as the field available for respondents to write any
additional ideas or comments.
o Results
The data shows that users are willing to report their experiences; however, due to the
lack of clarity in the process, they simply end up reporting exclusively to their
companies.
The data collected shows a lapse in the use of the RCSV, as only 11% of the pilots that
answered the survey informed that they have already reported their errors.
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o Conclusion
The Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority considers the CENIPA RCSV as the method of
compliance with the requirements of the ICAO Annex 19 for a voluntary safety
reporting system, but the RCSV appears not to be the most effective tool to fulfill the
requirement since approximately 88% of respondents have never filled out an RCSV
reporting an error.
Although there is already an official channel for pilots reporting identified hazards the RCSV - most of the airline pilots simply do not use it. Therefore, there is evidence
that, despite the existence of an official channel available by a Brazilian aviation
authority, there is room for improvement regarding the quantity of ASR collected by
the Brazilian aviation authorities.


Conclusion 3 – Stakeholders Perspective
o Data collection method
The data for conclusion 3 was collected using the interviews aimed at stakeholders of the
Brazilian Civil Aviation System.
o Results
If the three main stakeholders agree to participate in a collaborative ASR program, we have
a favourable scenario for the Brazilian reporting system to evolve. Either through a new
system or by redesigning the current primary system (RCSV). According to the interviews
with the Safety managers of the airlines, it was possible to see that a program of voluntary
and non-punitive reporting is well regarded as long as the policies, processes, and
procedures are very clear and defined among all those involved.
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Currently, Just Culture is a topic already discussed at the highest levels of airlines. The
idea passed on in the interviews showed use and interest in predictive processes, new pillars
of safety culture, and a change in aviation culture in favor of better results, aiming at
improving operational safety.
o Conclusion
Furthermore, according to interviews with airline safety managers, they would also be
willing to participate in such a program. In the same way, the association representing the
pilots reinforced its commitment to the non-punishment policies regarding voluntary
reporting programs. To complete the research on the willingness of the main stakeholders
involved in a new voluntary reporting program, ANAC's Safety managers also responded
positively about the possibility of an ASR program along the lines of the ASAP.

Description of Conclusions (Background)
Conclusion 1 - Pilots safety reporting culture
According to the survey, most pilots responded that they would report errors and
mistakes to the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority if a non-punitive reporting program is
implemented by the Authority.
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Figure 13: Pilots willingness to report under a non-punitive safety reporting program

About 89% of the Pilots informed that they would be willing to report errors and mistakes
if ANAC implements a Safety Reporting program that protects them from any administrative
sanction.
The aviation industry is a complex system. Errors and mistakes will be made by pilots
during their routine and non-routine operations. The fear of being punished by the Civil Aviation
Authority may not be attractive to voluntary reporting. This fear by a mistake or error could
inhibit the submission of safety reports by the pilots and, therefore, aviation authorities and air
operators may lose the opportunity to identify systemic or organizational problems more relevant
than the error itself.
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According to Himmelstein (1999), the fear of consequences on the job and disciplinary
actions appears as one of the top reasons for the under-reporting phenomena.
One of the current gateways to reporting that can help with the reporting of safety issues
is the mandatory reporting program. In these reports, pilots must report any operational
irregularities (IROPS), errors, violations, or any situation that may be required by the company.
The only problem with this kind of reporting is the fact that there is no protection for the reporter
against administrative sanctions.
In the USA, the aviation regulatory body (FAA) is the same which oversights of the ASAP
program. Nonetheless, in the same way that airlines managed to convey confidence to their
employees by reporting identified hazards to them without fear of suffering internal retaliation, the
Brazilian aviation authority can develop this trust among its regulated users. Again, this is a matter
of a positive safety culture
It is important to note that question 8 does not establish many details of what the
proposed reporting system would be, it only establishes the condition that it would be a nonpunitive system. The positive response of a large majority of respondents to this question leads
us to conclude that one of the most relevant characteristics for pilots adherence to a voluntary
reporting system is its non-punitive characteristic.
In August of this year, a joint regulatory publicized by ANAC and COMAER was released,
seeking to develop ways to improve the Reporting System for Brazilian Civil Aviation. The
favorable scenario identified by conclusion 5 of this study shows that stakeholders are willing to
work together to improve the voluntary reporting system within the Brazilian state aviation
authority.

63

Conclusion 2 - ICAO Annex 19 fulfillment and the RCVS
According to the research carried out, it is clear that a high safety reporting culture level
is present in the approached crew, as provided for in DOC 9859 “how people behave about
safety and risk when no one is watching.” The collected data shows that 89% (figure 13) of the
group of pilots would report mistakes if the ANAC implements a Safety Reporting program that
protects them from any administrative sanction.
Another important aspect that validates the perception of the high levels of safety
reporting culture among the Airline Transport Pilots is the fact that more than 70% of the pilots
reported that they have already filled out a Safety Report for their company self-reporting an
error.

Figure 14: Pilots reporting safety culture
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Figure 15: Pilots reporting error
Therefore, we can conclude that system users need greater clarity on where, how, and when
they should make their reports.
Despite the Safety Culture of reporting being present in the Brazilian airline Pilots’
group, this culture is only effective in reporting errors to airlines and not to the aviation
authorities. The CENIPA RCSV is considered by the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority the State
Reporting Program, but the tool seems to not have been used by the pilots to report errors or
mistakes when compared to the airlines own ASR tool. This is supported by the survey, which
identified that only 11% of the pilots have filled an RCSV reporting a self-error (Question 7,
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Figure 14) while 71% of the pilots have already filled a Safety Report for its company program
(Question 6, Figure 13)”
It is interesting how respondent pilots are available to report as long as there is a
guarantee of non-punitiveness. Among pilots, there is a culture of safety that is disseminated
from the beginning of their careers and continues to be implemented when these pilots join an
airline. As pilots, they know the importance of reporting but do not always feel comfortable
reporting a situation, be it an occasional mistake or even a violation.
Therefore, it is possible to affirm that the pilots are willing to carry out voluntary
reporting and that the RCSV, in its current form, as the Brazilian State Safety Reporting
program, might not be the most effective tool to capture threats, errors and mistakes.

Conclusion 3 - Stakeholders Perspective
According to the identification with stakeholders, a concern with aviation safety was
unanimous.
Safety is the priority for ICAO and its allied states. The interviews show the need to
optimize the voluntary reporting system and that, mainly, ANAC creates and establishes the
system, rules, and interaction between stakeholders.
It is interesting to note that the stakeholders are concerned with advancing the safety
culture, always protected by a just culture, for all areas of aviation, which are not just pilots.
Thinking about this vision in spreading, improving, and increasing aviation safety in the country,
it is concluded that there is a willingness to take part in projects that include these themes.
An important point as well as the issue of establishing clear rules so that everyone involved
is comfortable and trusting in the entire process.
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Chapter V
Recommendations, Future Research, and Lessons Learned

Considering all the data collected and the analysis performed, the researchers found
evidence to support a few recommendations. We believe that these recommendations will improve
safety in the Brazilian airline aviation industry. Each recommendation is related to at least one
conclusion listed in Chapter 4 of this study.


Recommendation One: ANAC should launch a new ASR program, with a different
scope from RCSV



Recommendation Two: ANAC should promote the Just Culture concept within the
Brazilian Civil Aviation



Recommendation Three: CENIPA needs to promote the Just Culture concept within the
Brazilian Civil Aviation



Recommendation Four: The Operational Safety Committee (PSO-BR) should review
the suitability of the RCSV program, and/or ANAC should have complete access to
safety data available by the Brazilian official Safety Report program



Recommendation Five: If a new voluntary self-report program is adopted, ANAC
should involve all the stakeholders to collaborate on the program design

Description of recommendations (Background)
Recommendation One
The Brazilian National Civil Aviation Authority should evaluate the implementation of a
non-punitive self-reporting program, as some other authorities around the world have already
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implemented. This non-punitive self-reporting program must have a clear process and
requirements in order to facilitate the Pilots and Airlines Managers understanding of the benefits
and consequences regarding their participation in such a program. Moreover, the program must be
supported by the Just Culture concept, which was not identified within the ANAC SMS literature
review.
In this context, the ICAO Annex 19 declares that “States shall take necessary measures,
including the promotion of a positive safety culture, to encourage safety reporting through the
systems referred to in 5.1.2 and 5.1.3” (ICAO, Annex 19, 5.3.5). “States shall establish a
mandatory safety reporting system that includes the reporting of incidents”. (ICAO, Annex 19,
5.1.2) and “States shall establish a voluntary safety reporting system to collect safety data and
safety information not captured by mandatory safety reporting systems”. (ICAO, Annex 19, 5.1.3).
Recommendation Two
It is also recommended to the Brazilian National Civil Aviation Authority to promote
educational and clarifying actions and policies that make the pilots willing to report their errors
and violations as much as they already do to their airlines. Like the airline's internal ASR program,
the Brazilian state's non-punitive self-reporting program needs a robust campaign to raise
awareness among pilots (actually among all the aviation community) on the use of Just Culture by
the Brazilian National Civil Aviation Authority in the management of voluntary reports. That the
collected information will be used solely for operational safety purposes, even being processed by
the regulatory authority.
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Recommendation Three
The Brazilian Investigatory Aviation Authority should update the CENIPA NSCA 3-3
(Flight Safety Management in Brazilian Aviation) to include more aspects and concepts of just
culture and non-punitiveness.
Recommendation Four
Although the CENIPA RCSV is considered by the Brazilian State to fulfill the
requirements of Annex 13, it is clear that airline pilots do not normally use this channel to report
Hazards. So, it is recommended to the Brazilian Aviation Authorities to review the suitability of
the CENIPA RCSV as the method of compliance for the purpose of the ICAO Annex 19.
As two aviation authorities in Brazil (ANAC and CENIPA) share the responsibility of
managing the operational safety of civil air activities in Brazil, the collection and processing of
voluntary reports are not favored. Nonetheless, it is difficult for one authority to adopt incentives
or waivers of administrative sanctions without overriding the attributions of another authority.
In this context, due to the structure of the PSO-BR, the adoption of the same strategy used
by the FAA ASAP is hampered. Nowadays it is necessary extreme coordination, cooperation, and
collaboration among two authorities to promote an increase in the number of reports processed by
the Brazilian state.
Recommendation Five
If the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority decides upon the implementation of a new nonpunitive reporting system by the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority, the Pilots Associations and
Airline management should be involved and participate in the development and implementation
of the program. Senior leaders must be involved and support the implementation of a non-punitive
reporting program by the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority. With a more robust system of
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confidentiality in the processing, Brazilian airlines could also be willing to share their safety data
with the Brazilian civil aviation authority and help to improve the State Safety system.

Future Research



The researchers believe further studies should be conducted to assess the benefits of a nonpunitive safety reporting program to embrace other aviation professionals apart from pilots.
Mechanics, flight attendants, flight dispatchers, ground personnel, Airlines’ Operational
Control Center professionals, etc. There are many others involved that can also be part of a
non-punitive reporting system, improving the overall safety performance of the Brazilian
Aviation Industry.



Besides it, to develop studies for the Brazilian CAA not to be exposed to accusations of
interference as a supervisory body. For example, the Brazilian aviation authority needs to be
legally supported not to be accused of misconduct if it does not punish a user who violated an
ANAC regulation.

Lessons Learned



The main learning point from this work is that there is a strong safety culture among
Brazilian airline pilots. The active participation of the National CAA in a structured and
robust non-punitive safety reporting program can increase the operational safety performance
of the entire Brazilian air transport industry.
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Regarding the pilots who participated in the survey, we noticed their commitment to flight
safety and concern for a Just Culture, therefore, any implementation must be based on
knowledge and non-punitiveness.



One of the problems encountered in applying surveys and questionnaires was the
unavailability of CENIPA, due to the large workload during the days we had available.



One of the biggest conclusions is the importance that a reporting system offers to the
Brazilian aviation industry and that these systems extend to other areas and not just to pilots.



Researchers have identified a robust ASR system within Brazilian airlines. It is not the
purpose of this study to propose the replacement of this channel. The researchers understand
that there would be a setback in the risk management carried out by Brazilian Airlines if civil
aviation professionals stopped using the airlines own ASR program and started using only a
new “Brazilian ASAP.” The idea is that such programs are complementary, not
“competitors”. Likewise, the researchers emphasize that a “Brazilian ASAP” should not be
seen as a competitor to the existing RCSV. This is based on the fact a self-report is not
protected within RCSV protocols. In the RCSV program, only the reporter has their identity
preserved, and the reported does not (NSCA 3-3, section 3.6.2.5; 2013). If both are the same
person, there would be a discouraging conflict to fill out a self-report.
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